

TLP CLEAR – IN OBSCURA CAVEATS APPLY



IN OBSCURA LLC
THREAT INTELLIGENCE – SECURITY COUNTERMEASURES- INVESTIGATIONS
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA
<https://inobscura.org/>

Judges 6:12 ESV And the angel of the Lord appeared to him and said to him, “The Lord is with you, O mighty man of valor.”

THREAT INTELLIGENCE NOTE - TERROR ATTACK NEUTRALIZED

PARIS, FRANCE, 2018

KNOW THE TARGET – WATCH THE TARGET – LOOK DEEPER – EXPECT THE UNEXPECTED

CAVEAT: THIS INTELLIGENCE PRODUCT RELIES ON OPEN-SOURCE MEDIA OR GOVERNMENT RELEASED UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION. RECOMMENDED ACTIONS ARE INCLUDED FOR CLIENTS FOR INFORMATION AND ACTIONS DEEMED APPROPRIATE.

WARNING: THE THREAT LEVEL FOR THE HOLIDAY SEASON IS URGENT AND REQUIRES HIGH VIGILANCE INCREASED SURVEILLANCE BY CHURCH SECURITY FORCES. REMEMBER IN OBSCURA HAS WARNED ON THE TARGET SURVEILLANCE AND INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AGAINST CHURCHES.

CHURCH THREAT LEVEL – URGENT

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This note is provided to “Know the Target” premise of the In Obscura mission. You will read the report of a journalist investigation by the Peoples Mujahideen of Iran Organization. You will see detailed reporting of open-source information. SUBJECT Asadollah ASSADI, Iranian Attache and other operatives were arrested as for planning his mission to bomb the annual conference of the Gran Gathering of The Iranian Opposition (Free Iran Rally). Then during May 2023, HE was freed, after an Oman-brokered swap deal according to which Iranian diplomat convicted of terrorism was freed in exchange for a Belgian hostage. THEY returned to Tehran.

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The swap was for Belgian aid worker Olivier Vandecasteele, who was detained in 2022 and sentenced to 40 years in prison and 74 lashes for alleged “spying and cooperation with the United States, money laundering and smuggling \$500,000 out of Iran,” was also released as part of the deal. This year the gathering was quite different from the previous 14 rallies considering the continued protest/uprisings in the country which began last December and has been going on since. The participants of the #FreeIran2018 rally in Paris expressed support for the nationwide uprising of the Iranian people, including the Bazaar merchants who have risen recently against the regime’s corrupt policies.

WHY THIS INTELLIGENCE NOTE?

As the title includes “...Know the Target...” premises of the In Obscura mission, church security forces must understand and value the knowledge gained from past terror operations, tactics, techniques and procedures and retain enough of this knowledge to appreciate the threats, attacks, and how to detect these activities along the pre-attack cycle. I am very emphatic about target surveillance. This article is an excellent look into counterintelligence and counterterrorism operations and investigations, and WHY you must be committed to church security, knowing that global jihad in the Crusades mission of Christian Genocide including inside the U.S.



The Assadi file: More undeniable evidence on Tehran's bombing plot against the Iranian Resistance

- 12/30/2020 Author: [Shahin Gobadi](#)
<https://english.mojahedin.org/i/assadollah-assadi-trial-investigation-evidence-20201230>

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Iranian regime's terrorist diplomat, Assadollah Assadi, known as Daniel, in Luxembourg to hand an IED (improvised explosive device) loaded with 500 grams TATP explosives to the terrorist couple of Saadouni-Naami.

Analysis by PMOI/MEK

Iran, December 30, 2020—At the end of January, a Belgian court will issue a verdict on the trial of the Iranian diplomat **Assadollah Assadi**, charged with plotting a bombing attack against the **2018 Free Iran rally** of the Iranian opposition in Paris. During two-and-half years of investigation, Belgian authorities have found undeniable evidence revealing connections between Assadi and three other terrorists involved in the foiled plot.

The evidence shows the terrorist couple Amir Saadouni and Nasimeh Naami traveled to Iran on several occasions for instructions and training by the Ministry of Intelligence (**MOIS**).

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Stamps on Naami's passports for her various travels to Iran.

Nasimeh Naami traveled to Iran at least 12 times between 2010 and 2018, including two trips in 2010, one in 2011, four in 2013, one in 2014, two in 2015, two in 2017, and one in 2018. Saadouni accompanied Naami on five of these trips. Saadouni also made five other independent trips to Iran. Police investigations designated Naami as the leader among the couple.

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Vraag: Heeft u Jawad ooit ontmoet ?

Antwoord: In 2010 vroeg 'Jawad' ons om naar Iran te komen. Samen met Nasimeh ben ik dan naar Iran gereisd, ik denk dat het in de zomer was. Op de luchthaven werden wij opgehaald door twee personen. Later bleek dat één van hen 'Jawad' was. 'Jawad' en de andere persoon zijn samen met ons vanuit Teheran naar Ahwaz gevlogen.

Vraag: Kan u ons vertellen wat er is gebeurd tijdens uw verblijf in Ahwaz ?



2/8

Federale gerechtelijke politie - Provincie Antwerpen - 7314
Noordersingel 25-27 - 2140 ANTWERPEN

Bijlage 1 aan PV 522337/2018
Notitie FD.35.97.000019/2018
(T) 03/217.81.11 - (F)

Antwoord: Eerst mocht ik van hen samen met Nasimeh tijd doorbrengen met mijn familie Abadan. De familie van Nasimeh woont ook in Abadan. Onze families wonen niet ver van elkaar. Na twee weken belden ze mij op en zeiden dat wij naar een bepaald hotel moesten komen. In de lobby van het hotel werden we door hen opgewacht, 'Jawad' en nog een andere collega. Ze namen Nasimeh en mij mee naar een hotelkamer waar we een 7-tal uren met elkaar spraken. Buiten Jawad waren er nog 2 of 3 personen aanwezig. Het waren delegaties van Teheran, Ahwaz en Abadan. Er werd gesproken over de activiteiten van de Mujahideen, hoe hun organisatie in elkaar zat.

Vraag: Bent u na de ontmoeting met 'Jawad' in Iran 'actiever' geworden ?

Antwoord: Nee, ik ben gewoon zoals voordien inlichtingen blijven doorsturen. Na mijn terugkeer naar België verliepen de contacten niet meer via 'Jawad' maar via "Ahmadzadeh", dat is een veel voorkomende familienaam zoals "Janssens" in België.

Vraag: Hoe verliep het contact met Ahmadzadeh ?

Antwoord: De eerste keer belde hij mij op en stelde zich voor. Hij zei dat we elkaar in Iran hadden ontmoet en dat 'Jawad' nu een andere opdracht had. Ik kreeg de opdracht om mijn activiteiten te blijven verder zetten. Net als voordien maakte ik alles per mail over. Net zoals Jawad beld hij mij altijd op met een onbekend oproepnummer.

Part of Saadouni's interrogation on his first contacts with the MOIS. He explains how two people picked him up at Tehran's airport and how he handed over the information about MEK's organizational structure.

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“In the winter of 2007, Javad was the first MOIS agent who contacted me,” Saadouni said in one of the hearings. According to Saadouni, Javad told him that Nasimeh's father was taken to the MOIS headquarters and will not return if they do not cooperate with the intelligence agency. “Since 2015 I was told that someone in Europe will contact me,” Saadouni said.

In August 2015, Assadollah Assadi contacted him for the first time and introduced himself as Daniel.

“He asked me to come to Munich with Nassimeh. He was the one who always specified the meeting locations. In Munich, he gave his email and 4000 Euros cash. He stayed in contact with us through SMS. Daniel changed his number every eight months, but he always used Austrian numbers. However, during our first meeting, he used a BASE number (Belgian phone company). In Luxembourg, I received 5,000 euros for another car and 17,000 euros for half a year of work for Daniel.”

According to Saadouni, after he and Naami were arrested, the MOIS sent a message through Nasimeh’s father saying that they must match their statements and say they worked for the MEK and not for the MOIS so that Daniel could be free.

“In that case, the Iranian government would support us financially,” Saadouni acknowledged. This recommendation was in line with the MOIS propaganda campaign that tried to blame the MEK for the attack. In it is worth reminding that on July 2, following the arrest of Assadi, the regime’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif called it a “false flag operation” to escape from an international “diplomatic” scandal.

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Belgian citizenship passports of Naami and Saadouni and their Iranian passport issued by regime’s embassy in Brussels, and Naami’s Iran Air ticket for Tehran.

In 2010, Naami and Saadouni got their Iranian passport from the Iranian regime’s embassy in Brussels and three months later they travel to Tehran and Ahvaz. Their passports are issued on June 9, 2010. This is while they were in Belgium as refugees and later obtained citizenship. These terrorists used their refugee and citizen status for espionage and terrorist plots without having any problems to travel.

Following their last meeting with Assadi on June 28, in Luxembourg, Assadi and Saadouni communicated with SMS through Austrian number 00436602227681 (Assadi) and the Belgian number 00320301120232050 (Saadouni). The messages were in coded language and writing in Persian with the Latin alphabet.

The conversation on Friday, June 29, a day before the bomb plot:

Assadi: “Is the game installed?”

Saadouni: “Yes we won. Will have a great breakfast Sunday”

Assadi: “Your team will win inshallah”

Saadouni: “The PlayStation4 (code word for the bomb) is installed, we are going to win the cup.

Assadi: “Is the TV plug (the bomb snares) installed?”

Saadouni: “Yes, it’s all right”

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Then, from 11:30 am, June 30, to 10:53 am, July 1, 2018, three unanswered messages from Assadi to Saadouni are registered, which shows Assadi is extremely worried and repeatedly asked whether everything is alright. Saadouni and Naami were arrested at 12:30 pm on June 30, in Sint-Pieters-Woluwe, near Brussels.

In its report on February 19, 2020, the Belgian Security Service the VSSE concluded Assadi is an MOIS security officer who works under diplomatic cover in the Iranian embassy in Vienna. Assadi is affiliated with department 312 of the MOIS and is an officer who works with human sources (spies and agents). He was the operational commander of the bomb plot against the annual rally of the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (**PMOI/MEK**) in Villepinte (France). The security service identified Assadi as the agent who controlled Amir Saadouni and Nasimeh Naami and delivered the explosives to them two days before the operation. The attack was on behalf of Iran and was not a personal initiative of Assadi, the report stated.

The Belgian prosecutors have demanded the maximum sentence of 20 years in prison for Assadi. They also demanded eighteen years for the couple and fifteen years Merhad Arefani, the fourth suspect involved in the plot. For the trio, the prosecutor demands their Belgian nationality to be revoked. During the past two years of investigation, Arefani has constantly claimed innocence and stated that he has never known Assadi. This is while the undeniable evidence in the file reveals Arefani's connection with the MOIS, his connection with Assadi, and his role in the attack.

While inspecting Arefani's home, the police found various USB sticks, laptops, computers, cellphones, numerous SIM cards, hard disks, and different types of cameras. This unusual situation made clear to the police that materials were used for intelligence gathering and spying purposes.

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1/6

Federale gerechtelijke politie - Provincie Antwerpen - 7311
Proceduresnel 25-27 + 21.40 ANTWERPEN

PV nr. 524931/2018
Notitie FD.15.97.000019/2018
(7/93/21783.11.01)

— De Camera Eyewear 1080P HD heeft een verborgen Megapixel High Definition Digitale videocamera waarmee digitale video's kunnen opgenomen worden met hoge kwaliteit: 1920 x 1080P. Met de bril kunnen ook foto's genomen worden.

De foto's en de video's kunnen opgeslagen worden op een micro SD kaart (TF Card) van 32 GB. Via de USB poort is er een gemakkelijk verbinding mogelijk met een PC of laptop. De Camera Eyewear 1080P HD bril is voorzien van een microfoon.

— De Camera Eyewear 1080P HD is verkrijgbaar via het internet.

— De technische specificaties en foto's van de Camera Eyewear 1080P HD worden gevoegd in bijlage 04.

R Tech
PROCES-VERBAAL
BILLAGES 1-4
AAN 971
F. 05/05/2018 / 2018
DE JUDGE VAN FOP ANT

CATEGORIES Body Worn Cameras

LATEST NEWS

CONTACT US

Arefani's spy glasses with the ability to record, audio, video and taking pictures.

On January 18, Saadouni told the police he had received a USB stick from Assadi to record the MEK's private meetings. This was similar to the USB Arefani had in his home. The police also found a Camera Eyewear 1080P HD in Arefani's home with the ability to record videos, voices and taking pictures. Also, a USB voice recorder with 8GB memory was found.

Vaststellingen met betrekking tot het gebruik van USB-sticks

-- op 18-7-2018 verklaarde **SAADOUNI** Amir dat hij van 'Daniël', door onze diensten geïdentificeerd als **ASSADI** Assadollah, een USB-stick ontving waarmee hij geluidsopnames kon maken tijdens vergaderingen. Hij vermoedde dat **AREFANI** Mehrdad ook een contactpersoon was van Daniël. (Cfr navolgend Proces-verbaal nummer 517493/2018)

-- tijdens de huiszoeking die op 30-6-2018 werd uitgevoerd op het adres van inschrijving van **AREFANI** Mehrdad te Ukkel, Emile Clausstraat 61/77, werd meerdere USB-sticks aangetroffen waarmee het mogelijk is om opnames te maken (Cfr navolgend Proces-verbaal nummer 516248/2018)

On July 18, 2018, Saadouni confessed to have received USB sticks from Assadi, also known as Daniel, to record MEK meetings. The same type of USB's was found on Arefani's home.


In another interrogation session, Saadouni told the police always guessed Arefani was Assadi's agent. Saadouni told the Belgian police, "Every time I lied to Assadi about the facts of the MEK events, somehow Assadi knew I was lying. Mehrdad was always present. No matter what. Therefore, I'm sure he was in contact with Assadi."

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Mehrdad Arefani was arrested in Villepinte by the French police and later extradited to Belgium. At the first court hearing on November 27, 2020, the Belgian prosecutor described Arefani's role as Assadi's eyes and ears who controlled whether Naami and Saadouni were getting the job done.



The police decoded Arefani's connections with Assadi.

Arefani was the main person on the scene who was remain at the Free Iran rally until the end of the program while Assadi was waiting for his reports. In addition, while the police were searching Arefani's homel, they confiscated an Alcatel telephone, which he used to communicate with Assadollah Asadi. In the memory of this device, an Austrian telephone number was registered as *Dadash*, the Persian colloquial term for *brother*. The terrorist used the same tactic to change numbers. Assadi would give them a number first, and then give them a four-digit number, normally a date which would be recognizable by the recipient, they would then subtract that four-digit number from the previous number and that would be the new telephone number.

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Both the couple and Arefani used the same method of four-digit codes to change their numbers with Assadi.

Mehrdad Arefani's lawyer **claimed** that he is a poet and not a terrorist or a spy and said the phone Arefani had in his possession was to contact his "brother" in Austria. This is while Arefani had mentioned in his statement to the police that he had not even seen his brother for a long time and did not have any good relations with him. The *Dadash* entry was, in fact, Assadi's number. Arefani would be Assadi's eyes and ears at the scene of the attack.

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PayPal

Mehrdad AREFANI is bij PayPal houder van de account 2265007696785262741 (geopend op 16/02/08), 1192832014076151334 (geopend op 05/03/13), 2279670413789429650 (23/08/17) en 1875501489033714033 (geopend op 21/02/13).

Deze accounts werden hoofdzakelijk gebruikt voor courante verrichtingen. Er waren echter enkele aankopen, hoofdzakelijk voor kleine bedragen, die toch de aandacht trekken. Deze aankopen kregen de volgende omschrijvingen mee:

- 2 in 1 USB Digital Audio Spy Voice Recorder Pen 8GB Disk Flash Drive Recording,
- 1Pc AK435 360 Degree Self-leveling Cross Laser Level 2 Line 1 Point with Package,
- Hot Mini 8GB USB Disk Pen Drive Digital Audio Voice Recorder 150 hrs Recording,
- 8GB Digital Audio Voice Recording Recorder Spy Pen MP3 Player USB Drive Stereo,
- M65 COMBAT FIELD JACKET MENS VINTAGE TYPE MILITARY ARMY COAT QUILTED LINER BLACK [L],
- Microphone Omnidirectionnel Cravate / 3.5mm Mini-jack avec Adaptateur 1/4",
- Adjustable 20-29mm Tactical Barrel Mount for Flashlight Laser Torch Sight Scope.



Spy materials bought by Arefani, including various USB voice recorders.

Arefani also use several PayPal accounts to purchase various spying and recording accessories.

The evidence also proves that for the regime in Tehran, this was a comprehensive operation to eliminate the opposition for a long period. The regime used its highest MOIS officer in Europe to personally hand over the bomb to activated “sleeper cells” and to hit the heart of the Iranian Resistance in Paris.

During many interrogations, Saadouni clearly acknowledge that Assadi’s main goals but no one other than **Maryam Rajavi**, the President-elect of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (**NCRI**). However, if the plan succeeded, it would not stay an Iranian matter but matter of international and political crisis, since many citizens and prominent politicians from Europe and United States were among the tens of thousands of people who could be slaughtered in the attack. Therefore, **Assadi’s trial**, which consist undeniable evidence of regime’s direct role, is not just a terrorist case but a historic test to end mullahs’ corrupt chain of terrorism and blackmailing that has lasted for 40 years.

///END///

=====DISSEMINATION=====

IN OBSCURA HAS ADOPTED THE OSINT CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM OF DHS

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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: TLP CLEAR, TLP Clear: when information carries minimal or no foreseeable risk of misuse, in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release. **HOWEVER IN OBSCURA RELEASE PROHIBITION MARKINGS APPLY** <https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/traffic-light-protocol-tlp-definitions-and-usagg>

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REQUEST WRITTEN PERMISSION, EMAIL, PRIOR TO DISSEMINATING ANY IN OBSCURA PRODUCTS OR INFORMATION.

TRAFFIC LIGHT PROTOCOL REQUIREMENTS FOR DISSEMINATION

Traffic Light Protocol (TLP) Definitions

Color	When should it be used?	How may it be shared?
 <p>TLP:RED For the eyes and ears of individual recipients only, no further disclosure.</p>	Sources may use TLP:RED when information cannot be effectively acted upon without significant risk for the privacy, reputation, or operations of the organizations involved.	Recipients may therefore not share TLP:RED information with anyone else. In the context of a meeting, for example, TLP:RED information is limited to those present at the meeting.
 <p>TLP:AMBER Limited disclosure, recipients can only spread this on a need-to-know basis within their organization and its clients. Note that TLP:AMBER+STRICT restricts sharing to the organization only.</p>	Sources may use TLP:AMBER when information requires support to be effectively acted upon, yet carries risk to privacy, reputation, or operations if shared outside of the organizations involved.	Recipients may share TLP:AMBER information with members of their own organization and its clients, but only on a need-to-know basis to protect their organization and its clients and prevent further harm. Note: if the source wants to restrict sharing to the organization only, they must specify TLP:AMBER+STRICT.
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